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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Jackson v. State:
PRIOR
CONVICTIONS
OF SIMILAR
CRIMES MAY BE
ADMISSIBLE FOR
IMPEACHMENT
PURPOSES WHEN
THE PROBATIVE
VALUE OF THE
EVIDENCE
OUTWEIGHS THE
PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT.

In Jackson v. State,
340 Md. 705, 668 A.2d 8
(1995), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that admitting a
similar prior conviction to impeach an accused's testimony
is within the trial court's discretion and not per se inadmissible
if the probative value of the
evidence outweighs any unfair
prejudice to the defendant. The
court also enumerated several
factors that the trial judge should
consider when balancing the
probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect. In
so holding, the court stressed
the importance ofthe balancing
requirement but left to the trial
court's discretion the manner in
which this is accomplished.
Robert M. Jackson
("Jackson") was convicted of
theft of$300 or more for stealing a computer from Lombard
Hall at the University of Maryland. At trial, Edward White
("White"), a housekeeper, testified that he admitted Jackson
to Lombard Hall at 5:30 p.m.
and that Jackson returned to the
building again at 6:00 p.m. At
that time, White noticed that
two University recycling boxes
were missing. Later, White saw
Jackson standing next to the
missing boxes, which contained
the computers. Jackson explained to White that he was
taking the computers home to
do work for his supervisor.
White subsequently
identified Jackson as the person
who removed the computers.
When the police arri ved at Jackson's home, they observed Jackson in an alley discarding boxes

bearing the University emblem.
The police arrested and charged
Jackson with one count oftheft
of $300 or more.
Before trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
Jackson filed a motion in limine
to exclude evidence of two prior thefts in 1991. Although
Jackson received probation before judgment for the first theft,
he was convicted for the second. In response to Jackson's
motion in limine, the trial court
excluded the evidence of the
probation before judgment. As
to the conviction, the trial court
stated that if Jackson testified,
then the prior theft conviction
would be admissible to impeach
him under Maryland Rule of
Evidence 5-609, because the
probative value outweighed the
prejudicial effect. When Jackson portrayed himself as a "stellar" individual on direct, the
prosecutor introduced the prior
conviction as impeachment evidence on cross-examination.
The jury convicted
Jackson and the judge sentenced
him to five years imprisonment.
Jackson appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland. Prior to consideration by
the
intermediate appellate
court, the court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the trial judge
abused her discretion by admitting a prior theft conviction to
impeach the credibility of a defendant charged with theft.
The court of appeals
began its analysis with an historical overview of the rules
governing the admission of pri-
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or convictions for impeachment
purposes. At common law, a
person was considered incompetent to testify after being convicted of an infamous crime or
a crime involving dishonesty.
Jackson, 340 Md. at 711-12,
668 A.2d at 11 (citing State v.
Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 214,
642 A.2d 870, 874 (1994);
Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348,
359,535 A.2d445,450 (1988)).
In 1864, the Legislature removed this disqualification and
stated that such a person could
testify, but the prior conviction
was admissible for impeachment purposes. Jackson 340
Md. at 712,668 A.2d at 11-12
(citing Prout v. State, 311 Md.
348, 359, 535 A.2d 445, 450
(1988)).
Presently, Maryland
Rule of Evidence 5-609 controls the admission ofprior convictions for impeachment purposes. The rule states, in pertinent part, that prior convictions
may be elicited from a witness
or by public record if: (1) it was
for an infamous crime or a crime
relevant to the witness's credibility; and (2) the conviction is
less than fifteen years old; and
(3) the court finds that the probative value of the evidence as
to credibility outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. Id. at 712-13, 668
A.2d at 12.
Addressing Jackson's
motion to exclude all prior convictions similar to the crime
charged, the court rejected the
defendant's arguments for three
reasons. Id. at 714,668 A.2d at
12-13. First, Rule 5-609 does
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not contain explicit language
excluding similar prior convictions. Second, a per se bar on
admissibility ofsuch statements
would deny trial judges needed
flexibility in particular cases.
Finally, such a rule would unfairly shield a defendant who
specializes in certain crimes
from cross-examination concerning this specialty. Id. at
714,668 A.2d 13.
Next, the court recognized that although a defendant
has the right to testify in his
own defense, the State also has
the right to impeach the defendant with prior convictions if
the evidence will assist the
factfinder in assessing the defendant's credibility. Id. (citing Ricketts v. State, 291 Md.
701, 703, 436 A.2d 906, 908
(1981 )). The balancing of the
probative value of the evidence
against the unfair prejudice to
the defendant imposes a limitation on the use of prior convictions in order to avoid the admission of such evidence solely to create a negative impression of the accused. Id. at 716,
668 A.2d at 13. This requirement is particularly important
when the prior conviction is
similar to or identical to that
presently charged, because a
prior conviction may suggest to
the jury that the defendant committed the present crime. Id.
Due to this tendency, the trial
judge must weigh the legitimate probative value against
unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id. at716,668A.2dat 14.
Since Rule 5-609 was
partially derived from Federal

Rule of Evidence 609, the court
looked to federal case law for
guidance in interpreting the
balancing prong ofthe rule. The
court of appeals discussed the
factors that the federal courts
developed to guide trial judges
in weighing the probative value
against unfair prejudice. Id. at
717,668 A.2d at 14.
The seventh circuit has
established five factors for trial
judges to consider when balancing probative value against
unfair prejudice. Id. (citing
United States v. Mahone, 537
F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976)).
The factors are: "( 1) the impeachment value of the prior
crime[,] (2) the point in time of
the conviction and the defendant's subsequent history[,] (3)
the similarity between the past
crime and the charged crime[,]
(4) the importance of the defendant's testimony[,] and (5) the
centrality of the defendant's
credibility." Id.
Upon approving the usage of the Mahone factors, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
cautioned that the factors should
not be considered in isolation
of each other by the trial courts
when balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.
The court urged trial judges to
explain the specific factors or
considerations used in the decision. Id.
Applying these factors
to the case at bar, the court of
appeals determined that the evidence should be admitted because four of the five factors
weighed in favor of admission
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of Jackson's prior theft conviction. First, theft is inherently
dishonest and reflects adverselyon the witness's honesty. Id.
at 721-22, 668 A.2d at 16. Second, the conviction was less
than three years old, as opposed
to more remote in time. Id.
Third, since Jackson's credibility was central to the case, it
was important to allow the State
to present evidence of similar
prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Id. The factor
pertaining to the similarity of
the charged offense to the prior
conviction, however, weighed
against admissibility because of
the potential harm to the defendant. Id. at 720-21,668 A.2d at
16.
Since the defendant in
the instant case presented himself as a "stellar" individual,
the court noted it would have
been extremely unfair not to
allow this image to remain unchallenged. Id. at 722,668 A.2d
at 16. Furthermore, the court
stressed that the trial court lim-

ited the prejudice by instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for evaluating Jackson's credibility and the State
did not attempt to misuse the
evidence by overemphasizing
the prior conviction. Id. In
sum, since the court found that
credibility was central to the
case and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed
the prejudicial effect, it concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior conviction. Id.
In a dissenting opinion,
Judge Bell disagreed with the
majority's use of the Mahone
factors and stated that they provided a "road map" for trial
judges to find "infamous crimes
and crimes affecting credibility
per se admissible." Id. at 727,
668 A.2d at 19. In particular,
Judge Bell gave more weight to
the third factor, similarity ofthe
conviction to the crime charged,
leading to the cOl1clusion that
the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its prej-

udicial impact. Id. at 733, 668
A.2d at 22.
In ho lding that evidence
of prior convictions similar to
those presently charged are not
per se inadmissible, the Court
ofAppeals ofMaryland in Jackson v. State emphasized the fundamental necessity of balancing the probative value of the
evidence against the prejudicial effect. In a trial where
credibility is central to the case
and the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, a
prior conviction of a similar
crime may be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes. The court further urged
that trial judges should state, on
the record, the specific factors
or considerations employed
when balancing the probative
value against unfair prejudice,
in order to insure efficient appellate review.
- Michele L. Katz
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